Spinoza: a cross examination - part 2

Le Clerc and Clarke seemed to make sense. But I had reservations about some of their lines of argument. I’ll withhold judgment, however. It’s best to see the interchanges and come to my conclusions after the entire case is on the table.

(Everyone settles down into their chairs. Spinoza gets back into the hot seat. Jacob Vernet gets his notes in order. The humming chatter gets more and more faint. Matt ascends the soap box.)

Matt: Welcome back everyone. I hope everyone is enjoying this as much as myself. Le Clerc and Clarke did a great job, and Spinoza has been a great sport so far. Remember, we’re all here to find out the truth, no matter where it leads. At this time, I’d like to ask Jacob Vernet to voice his criticisms.

Vernet: Thank you Matt. I don’t have much to offer. Le Clerc and Clarke stole much of my thunder. I will say I disagree with one thing Clarke said, . . .

(From the back of the room.)

Clarke: Aren’t we on the same side?

(Snickers are heard.)

Vernet: Now, now. I don’t deny we share a common ground. But let me get at Spinoza in my own way here. I do disagree with you, Spinoza.

Spinoza: Alright. And everyone is waiting for your reasons.

Vernet: Let me get clear on just what you mean. You deny miracles because they violate the laws of nature?

Spinoza: Yes.

Vernet: And Clarke rebutted you by denying that there were laws of nature. All we have is a God willing things to happen in a uniform way. That is, in a usual way. Nature isn’t on its own, going on ‘of its own accord’. Nature, to Clarke, is just the way it is because, at every moment, God is willing it to be that way. He just wills it to be some ways more than others. That’s why it looks to us as if there’s regularity, and therefore laws.

Spinoza: For goodness sake, do we have a question in the near future?

Vernet: I’m sorry. I don’t see the need to deny ‘laws of nature’ in your sense, Mr. Spinoza. I just don’t think these laws have to be necessary.

Spinoza: Why not? God is necessary, so the laws are necessary. The laws reflect God’s nature.

Vernet: And that’s where I disagree. I do think they depend on God’s will. No one denies that. But we have to remember a possibility here.

Spinoza: Such as?

Vernet: The possibility that we only think the laws are necessary because nature looks like it behaves the same much of the time.

Spinoza: I don’t follow you at all.

Vernet: How do we know the laws are necessary?

Spinoza: They never change.

Vernet: How do you know that? How old are you?

Spinoza: What is the relevance of such an insolent ques . . .

Vernet: Your life is a blip on the radar screen. In your entire life, you only observe a speck of the behavior of nature. But this is a speck on a humongous canvass. So, again, I ask: How do you know they never change?


Spinoza: They probably don’t change, is that better?

Vernet: As long as you acknowledge the other possibility.

Spinoza: The possibility that . . . what was the possibility again?


Vernet (looking exasperated): The possibility that you think the laws are necessary because they ‘look’ that way, and they look that way based on the experience you’ve had during your short life.

Spinoza: I guess I’ll concede that’s possible.

Vernet: Well, if that’s possible, then it’s also possible that the laws of nature aren’t necessary. They’re just what God happens to be willing at the time. And He can will something totally different if He wants to. Miracles are just the events that are more rare.

Spinoza: That would mean that the course of Nature isn’t necessary. What about the idea that came up in my talk with Clarke?

Vernet: What idea?

Spinoza: The idea that what you call miracles, I call regular old events that obey some law of nature we don’t know about.

Vernet: Yes, I remember hearing that. I’m not so sure. I think Le Clerc’s discussion gives us a good point, though. That might work for an isolated miracle, but not a consistent cluster of miracles during a certain short period of time.

Spinoza: That does make that possibility rather unlikely.

Vernet: It looks like that even though Clarke and I disagree on some peripherals, we are alike in that we have you at a deadlock here.

Spinoza: It does seem so.


Vernet: And that’s all I have for now. Matt?

Matt: Thanks Jacob!


(Vernet steps down. Spinoza looks uneasy. Houtteville is ready.)

Matt: Let me introduce Claude François Houtteville.

(Clearing of throats. Shifting in seats. Whispering abates.)

Houtteville: Thank you. I’m afraid I can’t add on too much more to what our distinguished guests have already contributed. For myself, I can’t see why God can’t do miracles. He can do what He wants. He’s God. He makes the laws what they are. And so He can make them in such a way that He can suspend them if He wants, period. Spinoza?

Spinoza: I mean, there’s not much else to say. You obviously weren’t listening to the other conversations I’ve had. If you did, you would have heard that the laws are necessary because God is necessary.

Houtteville: I did listen to the part where Vernet got you to concede that you don’t really have a good reason to think the laws are necessary, right?


Spinoza: True.

Houtteville: So, if it’s more probable than not that they’re not necessary, then I don’t see what’s wrong with my initial position: miracles are possible because God can do what He wants. But let me move this talk in another direction. Let’s assume your position for a second. You think the laws are necessary because God’s nature is necessary.

Spinoza (feeling like a pinnate): Yes.

Houtteville: But what about this possibility? The possibility that the miracles were planned. What if God’s nature is necessary, and necessarily willed these miracles to happen as part of the whole fabric of creation?

Spinoza: You know. That is a good point. I’ll have to think about that. This does, though, make miracles not violations of laws of nature, just what we know about the laws of nature. It’s hard to see how they’re ‘super’ natural if that’s the case.

Houtteville: That’s all.

(Houtteville steps down. A light applause follows. Spinoza stands for the first time, stretching. Sits again beside Hume. They begin whispering in each other’s ear. For some reason, Hume cackles. )

Matt: Thank you everyone. I know Spinoza is probably exhausted. We thank his willingness to debate these issues with us today. Tomorrow we’ll put Hume under the crucible. But we’re not done with Spinoza. After the guests have weighed in, I’ll put forth my own views. So, you guys are free to go! Same time next week!