Plantinga and Kant

Back to Kant. Plantinga, in his book, Warranted Christian Belief, gave me some more help on the problem of Kant. I think I'm over the Kant hurdle for now.

Remember, Kant doesn't think we can know anything about Reality in itself (the Dinge, as it is called in the German) - another name for the Dinge is what Kant called the Noumena, where the Phenomena is what we can know. Now, of course, we shouldn't believe Kant unless he has arguments or reasons for his conclusion. The conclusion is - again - we can't know anything about the Dinge. We can't predicate properties of the Dinge. Plantinga summarizes Kant's conclusions thus: "our concepts are really rules for synthesizing the manifold into phenomenal objects we ourselves somehow constructed."

Where did this conclusion come from? Is it the result of a proof or argument? Or is it just a hypothesis that best explains certain data? Or is Kant's theory just elegant and beautiful and people are drawn to it in that way? Do people just bypass arguing for the conclusion because the theory as a whole is beautiful? But what if I too recognize its beauty, but I want an argument or reason for why it's true before I believe it?

A reason for Kant's theory might be what are called Kant's Antinomies. What if we have a powerful argument for the universe's beginning in time, and another equally powerful argument that the universe didn't begin in time? The two arguments are equally powerful. Suppose that for every thesis you come up with, you can give a powerful argument for it and a powerful argument against it. Kant thinks that if we can do this, this is proof of his Transcendental Idealism - objects in the world depend on the structure of our minds for their existence and structure. We have antinomies, Kant argues, because we think we're proving things in themselves, as opposed to Phenomena.

This happens, Kant says, when the principles of understanding step outside the bounds of the limits of experience. We're suppose to keep these principles within the bounds of experience, within the bounds of Phenomena, not the Dinge. For if we don't, if we extend them outside of experience, we have 'pseudo-rational' doctrines, doctrines that can't be confirmed or refuted, since both the confirmation and the refutation have equally powerful arguments supporting both!

So, what's Kant trying to argue for here? Remember his conclusion is: none of our concepts apply to the Dinge, the Noumena, the things in themselves. And because none of our concepts apply to the Dinge, none of our concepts refer to the Dinge, and so we can't think about the Dinge - we can only think about phenomena.

Possible Kantian argument for that conclusion: If we CAN think and refer to the Dinge, then the premises in the arguments for the thesis and against the antithesis are all true (or seem true to us). If the premises are all true, then so are the thesis and the antithesis (or seem so to us). If both the thesis and the antithesis is true, then a contradiction is true. But no contradictions are true. And it's impossible for there to be overwhelming reason to believe both P and not-P. Therefore, we can't think about or refer to the Dinge.

Objection: if Kant's above argument applies to the Dinge, why can't it also apply to the Phenomena?

Objection: Kant's antinomies are not good arguments at all. For example, Kant provides an argument for the conclusion: The universe had a beginning in time and is spatially limited. And then Kant also provides an argument for the conclusion: The universe had no beginning in time and is spatially unlimited. Without getting into detail, both arguments are not very good.

I'll expand more on the details, but in short, Kant doesn't give very good reasons for his conclusion that we can't think about or refer to the Dinge.